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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO VALUE STUDIES
“Value studies” refers to a form of liberal education developed at the European 
College of Liberal Arts (ECLA) in Berlin between 2003 and 2012. Based on this 
curricular approach, ECLA introduced its first degree program in 2009 and was 
formally recognized as a German university in 2011. The first cohort of students 
received their bachelor of arts degree in value studies in 2012. Our aim in this 
essay is to explain how the value studies curriculum honors and promotes ideals 
of democratic citizenship. But first, we present a brief sketch of the curriculum.
As the name suggests, value studies is a curriculum focused on questions about 
values. In an institution without departments, students work with faculty from a 
variety of academic backgrounds on moral, political, economic, epistemic, religious, 
and aesthetic questions with the understanding that such questions are naturally 
and deeply connected. While students read and write a great deal, often reflect in 
solitude, and occasionally listen to lectures, the central activity supported by the 
curriculum is conversation in small seminars and tutorials.  
The assumed connectedness of our questions about values is the first of four 
basic premises behind the curriculum. When studying ethics, we easily end up 
thinking about political or religious questions. An epistemic question may turn 
out to have an inescapable aesthetic aspect. Since the various issues on the table 
tend to be intimately connected, a value studies curriculum is by definition heavily 
integrated. The most natural way to ensure integration is to build up the curriculum 
around core courses that secure the relevant breadth and cohesion.
The second premise is that the most fundamental questions about values 
have a claim on us as human beings—no matter what we take a special interest 
in, and no matter what we do for a living. But we tend to specialize in values, 
to focus on a few and more or less lose sight of the rest. Sometimes this is as it 
should be, but often we miss out on the fullness of life to the detriment of ourselves 
and others. The demands of the moment, habit, anxiety, and selfishness may 
shrink a person’s world to a caricature of what it could be. Nicolai Hartmann, one 
of the thinkers whose work has been an inspiration for the development of value 
studies, thought that this is the common destiny of human beings. “The tragedy 
of man,” he once wrote, “is that of one who, sitting at a well-laden table, is 
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hungry but who will not reach out his hand, because he does not see what is 
before him.”1 There is enough truth in this dark yet also optimistic thought to 
justify a course of study that strives to combat our natural narrowness.
Value questions remain primarily “human” even in an academic context. 
This is the third premise. While values lend themselves to study—eminently 
so—no discipline, understood as a set of methods or a body of literature, can 
tame or appropriate them. The values of justice, beauty, and natural diversity 
are all studied fruitfully by experts in various contexts, for example, but their 
significance is pre-disciplinary and remains anchored in ordinary human life, 
even when addressed by academics. For that reason, the primary task of scholars 
dedicated to value studies is not to pursue or represent their respective disciplines, 
but to bring whatever expertise they have to bear on questions of general 
human significance.
The fourth and final premise is the most difficult to articulate, but important 
nonetheless. When we talk about “values,” we have in mind the goods, ends, 
and ideals by which we understand who we are and explain what we do. Values 
tend to be deeply personal, yet typically not just private. They often come into 
our purview as shared objects of attention and, at least to some extent, as fit-
ting objects of reasoned conversation. In fact, they commonly seem to call out 
for conversation. As creatures who value—wonder, cherish, and desire—we 
need an intimate yet open social space where we can talk together, a hall of 
joint and living reflection. Conversation, in other words, is one of the natural 
expressions of our many responses to things of value and meaningful experience: 
bafflement, bliss, ambivalence, frustration, anxiety. There is a crucial educa-
tional aspect to such conversation. It is, among other things, a conversation that 
each generation owes the next. To some extent it happens informally in families 
and among friends, and this is of immense importance; but in these contexts 
the conversation often remains too sporadic, too superficial, too private, or too 
one-sided to do full justice to the task. That’s why we need value studies.   
SELF-KNOWLEDGE, REFLECTION, AND CIVILITY
The ultimate educational ends of value studies are plural, and to some extent 
essentially open and contested. This is as it should be. It would be illiberal and 
counterproductive to assume that we could posit the telos of this sort of educa-
tional journey from the beginning. Nonetheless, one ideal outcome, arguably, 
is a deepened or refined self-knowledge. This is a personal good, but here it is 
important to point out that it is a civic good also. As Jean Bethke Elshtain 
wrote in a previous volume in the Civic Series, “people propel themselves into 
community and organizational life because there are things they care about, 
values they endorse, goods they embrace.”2 For most of us, most of the time, 
knowing who we are and what we care about makes us more meaningfully and 
sure-footedly engaged in civic and political life. A striking confirmation of this 
thought may be found in the important work of Adam Davis, in whose Civic 
Reflection Project we see a sister of value studies.3
Some might worry whether a course of study that defines itself by reference 
to values must in some manner take the form of indoctrination. The worry is 
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fair enough; but it is neither specific to value studies, nor is it possible to over-
come entirely in any form of education. Even studies that look purely instru-
mental or technical in character will involve value commitments. Implicitly or 
explicitly, every curriculum reveals a sense of relevance and an ideal of learning. 
The precise identification of these commitments may be difficult, but complete 
neutrality is impossible. Furthermore, there is no good reason to think that an 
explicit focus on values must be associated with some special bias or dogmatic 
modes of teaching. On the contrary, an explicit curricular focus on values may, 
under the right circumstances, inspire a reflectiveness that makes the educational 
endeavor less likely to be indoctrinatory. 
In the Euthyphro, Plato had Socrates point out that disagreement about values—
about “right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad”—is a 
common source of anger and enmity.4 This fact may sometimes be, or seem to 
be, a compelling reason for avoiding discussions about values. Some liberals, 
for example, dream of a neutral polity that would not commit a community to 
any substantial notion of the good life. Some academics pursue “value-free” science, 
and some educators seek to banish politics from their classrooms. Value studies 
is premised on the opposite thought: we cannot avoid substantial value commit-
ments (or disagreements) in politics, science, and education, and we are often 
better off facing them with as much candor as we can muster. In fact, the con-
frontations that emerge from such conversations often have profound educational 
value. As we work through them, we achieve reflective depth and have occasion 
to practice a number of intellectual and civic virtues of great significance, not 
least in a democracy. 
Of the various virtues needed to sustain a conversation about values, civility 
may be one of the most central. In a minimal sense, it marks our ability to main-
tain a basic respect and exhibit tolerance even when we disapprove of another 
person’s behavior or opinions. Civility in this sense, on occasion necessary in any 
public and genuine conversation about values, is probably a norm of behavior 
that no democratic community can do without. 
The term “civility” has another usage, however, according to which it is not 
merely a last resort in the effort of maintaining our community in the face of 
disagreement, but an expression of something more positive and more ambitious. 
As Robert Pippin suggests, civility may be understood as “as an active attempt 
to recognize and help to promote each other as free beings.”5 While a democracy 
could perhaps exist without this sort of civility, one may nonetheless think of it 
as a profound democratic ideal, as expressing a substantial and optimistic sense 
of equality and solidarity. The darkest moments of political life may seem to 
condemn this ideal as utopian; but if we believe that some utopias should be 
kept on the map somehow, we might want to design some of our curricula to 
promote exactly that sort of civility. Value studies does that. When we fore-
ground and face disagreements, we may also reveal deeper commonalities or 
discover new possibilities of harmonious diversity. In other words, while joint 
explorations of the good, the true, and the beautiful may reveal terrible human 
dilemmas and political dynamite of the most destructive kind, they are not divisive 
by definition. They do not just reveal the limits of freedom in a democracy, but 
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may help us push those limits a bit. We learn that the battle for freedom is not 
simply a zero-sum game. Since we don’t know where the limits of collective 
freedom lie, hope is a civic virtue closely related to civility. The study of values 
keeps that hope alive and helps us prevent politics from being a sphere that 
simply belongs to fate.
DISCIPLINE, EXPERTISE, AND WISDOM
The value studies curriculum was not designed to facilitate what we call “disciplinary 
training”: the command of a certain body of literature, a special set of methods, 
and one particular mode of thinking. Like other curricular innovations from 
the past century, value studies is meant to complement the one-sided dominance 
of disciplines in higher education. Many of us, even when grateful for the rigor-
ous disciplinary training we have received, have experienced how the disciplinary 
approach to learning may become self-serving and almost hide from view the 
human ends and issues for which most of us awoke to the life of learning in the 
first place. Arguably, this danger of losing one’s ends is inherent to disciplinary 
training. To be alive to fundamental questions about human ends in all their 
complexity is the first business of value studies; the sec-
ond is to make some sort of progress with them. There 
are competing conceptions of what this progress consists 
in, and that is as it should be. The main point here is that 
the insistence on staying with an issue, problem, or ques-
tion of fundamental human relevance involves a certain 
concentration and persistence that can only be under-
stood as a form of discipline in the everyday sense of that 
word—a capacity for focus, patience, and constancy of 
purpose. Moreover, this sort of discipline is not just a private good, but a civic 
virtue. A democracy needs citizens with a strong and not easily diverted sense of the 
goods and ideals for which we do everything we do. 
The focus on values fosters a deep sense of equality in the classroom. The 
most fundamental issues raised are those to which all human beings by virtue 
of their ordinary experience have some form of “privileged access.” At no 
moment in a conversation about values can it be ruled out that the most inter-
esting or fruitful contribution will come from a participant who is theoretically 
the least prepared. Sometimes our most important questions are the ones that 
look simplistic or obvious. It does not follow that expertise is irrelevant. On the 
contrary, our discussions about values constantly benefit from expert knowledge—
about literature, history, religion, anthropology, economics, statistics, technology, 
science, and other subjects. Being well-informed is a good thing, and a student 
may well be inspired by value studies to acquire and live by a certain expertise, 
practical or scholarly. What we learn from value studies is “simply” that the last 
word on fundamental human issues does not belong to the expert. 
This lesson should inspire us with the courage to ask innocent questions. 
It should also help us overcome, as far as possible, our tendencies to snobbism, ped-
antry, and theoretical arrogance. The implication is that those who teach value 
studies must do without the kind of authority that is guaranteed at other places 
 A democracy 
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of higher learning by departmental structure and students’ ability to choose as their 
goal of study a discipline that their teachers have already mastered. They nonethe-
less earn respect, if they are good, as knowledgeable and imaginative designers of 
syllabi, as attentive and inspiring teachers, and—ideally—as possessing a little of 
that human quality for which there is no better name than “wisdom.” As A. N. 
Whitehead wrote in The Aims of Education, “wisdom is the way in which knowledge 
is held. It concerns the handling of knowledge, its selection for the determination of 
relevant issues, its employment to add value to our immediate experience. This 
mastery of knowledge, which is wisdom, is the most intimate freedom obtainable.”6
EQUALITY, HUMILITY, AND SOLIDARITY
Value studies is essentially a democratic form of education. This curriculum is 
partially built around a deep sense of human equality, and it honors virtues 
that are crucial for democratic citizenship. That’s what we have been trying to 
argue so far. It is important to see, however, that the curriculum is not fanatically 
democratic; it is not closed to everything that does not bear a clear democratic 
stamp. While some democratic educators are intolerant of anything that challenges 
their democratic ideals, value studies allows us, nay invites us, to ask hard questions 
about our favored polity. As one of the most profound and sovereign ideals of 
our time, democracy itself is an obvious topic for a value studies curriculum. 
Back in 1923, Whitehead asked a hard question about equality as the central 
value in the complex ideal of democracy. “We are at the threshold of a democratic 
age,” he wrote, “and it remains to be determined whether the equality of man is to 
be realised on a high level or a low level.”7 This statement might be a good starting 
point for a seminar discussion at ECLA. It invites a principled discussion about the 
metaphors of high and low—that is, the nature and significance of hierarchical 
thinking. It may also provoke the egalitarian to think hard about his attachment to 
equality: what exactly am I committed to? Even firmly committed democrats should 
be able to ponder the question, or questions, behind this statement. No doubt, 
some will be tempted by this occasion to think antidemocratic thoughts, but 
others might be inspired to deepen their understanding of and attachment to the 
democratic ideal. Whitehead’s statement does not necessarily express the worries 
of a crypto-elitist. It may express a sense of human dignity that is deeply solidaristic. 
And it may suggest a worried question about the future of democracy: if we do 
not manage to realize human equality on a fairly high level, will the human 
race survive, and will it survive with its dignity intact? Arguably, now when the 
democratic age is well on its way, this question remains unanswered. 
Not only would Whitehead’s statement be a helpful starting point for an ECLA 
seminar, but it also provides a natural starting point for our final point about the 
significance of value studies for democratic citizenship. In order to make this point, 
let us develop the thoughts of the worried democrat a bit further. In this mood, we 
may feel a somber ambivalence about the concept of equality, as if it were a magnifi-
cent ship with a malignant stowaway. The belief that all human beings are equal has 
a tendency to bring with it another: the belief that every desire and satisfaction of 
every equal being must be equal too. Push-pin is as good as poetry, not because we 
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Who am I to judge? And who can judge me? In other words, noble egalitarianism 
leads many of us to (flirt with) shallow relativism. The common result, one might 
fear, is a character too timid to discriminate at all and defiantly proud of his own 
taste, whatever it happens to be. A version of Whitehead’s low realization of equality 
could be a “democratic” society inhabited by such persons. Because they lack humility 
and confidence, it would be a “formal” democracy suffering from a lack of individual 
aspiration and civic apathy—all in the name of a misguided sense of equality.
Our own mood is not always so dark, but the danger apprehended in that mood 
seems real enough. The democratic danger, if we may call it that, has particular 
sting in modern life. Modern life has many acute observers, but for our purposes 
Nicolai Hartmann is particularly helpful again: 
The life of man to-day is not favourable to depth of insight. The quiet and 
contemplation are lacking, life is restless and hurried; there is competition, 
aimless and without reflection. Whoever stands still for a moment is overtaken 
by the next. And as the claims of the outer life chase one another, so likewise 
do the impressions, experiences and sensations. We are always looking out 
for what is newest, the last thing continuously governs us and the thing be-
fore the last is forgotten ere it has been fairly seen, much less comprehended. 
We live from sensation to sensation. And our penetration becomes shallow, 
our sense of value is blunted, by snatching at the sensational. Not only is 
modern man restless and precipitate, dulled and blasé, but nothing inspires, 
touches, lays hold of his innermost being. Finally he has only an ironical and 
weary smile for everything. Yes, in the end he makes a virtue of his moral deg-
radation. He elevates the nil admirari, his incapacity to feel wonder, amazement, 
enthusiasm and reverence, into a planned habit of life. Callously passing 
lightly over everything is a comfortable modus vivendi. And thus he is pleased 
with himself in a pose of superiority which hides his inner vacuity.8
The modern democratic person lives a dangerous life. It is all too easy for 
us to become proud, diffident, and restlessly apathetic. Some respond to this 
problem with denial, others with despair. Some become reactionaries or secretly 
begin to despise democracy. Value studies is meant to help us avoid these temp-
tations. It is, among other things, a democratic and optimistic antidote to a 
democratic disease. It is a curriculum that invites students and teachers to the 
joint and solidaristic pursuit of high-minded equality.
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